En la Fórmula 1 todos se conocen

Hoy se sacaba la supuesta conversación entre Fernando y Dennis aquel fatídico 5 de agosto en Hungría. Un poco de ciencia ficción. Hasta qeu ambos personajes no salgan a decir si esto es así o no, siempre habrá que ponerlo en suspenso.

McLaren como ya se preveía, ha retirado el recurso presentó en Hungría, al respecto de que les quitaran los puntos del Mundial. Esto se entiende no fuera que lo pensaran mejor y les metieran los dos años sin correr y la sanción a los pilotos.

 La FIA está esperando que McLaren envíe el dossier sobre Renault. Ese que decían que tenían…

 Para Mosley el título de pilotos también está manchado.

Aquí teneis una bonita historia de rivalidad entre un taxista español y el blogger, que en las distancias cortas siempre es así, en el blog de Ed Gorman (en inglés)

 Y.. a todo esto… por una misma causa las gentes de la Fórmula 1 se unen independientemente del equipo que sean porque la intención en este caso es hacer un equipo español. ¡Claro que se puede hacer un equipo de Fórmula 1 español! porque además se está invirtiendo en Valencia. Nombres que están inscritos y que me hacen pensar (curioso que es uno…):

D. Ángel Baena Ingeniero de BMW Sauber F1 Team
D. Enrique Ballester Director Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingeniería en Diseño
D. Adrián Campos Presidente de la Fundación Adrián Campos
D. Antonio Cuquerella Ingeniero Equipo Super Aguri F1 Team
D. Marc Gené Piloto probador de Ferrari F1 Team;
Piloto oficial del Equipo Peugeot Le Mans Series

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13 Respuestas a “En la Fórmula 1 todos se conocen

  1. Pingback: En la Fórmula 1 todos se conocen | BMW

  2. De antemano pido perdón por el rollito que voy a soltar.Varias cosas:

    -En T5 han explicado hoy el tema de los pagos de Alonso a los mecánicos. Al parecer, en sus tiempos de Renault, Fernando repartía el premio en metálico “extra” que se llevaba por subir al podium entre todo el equipo (algo parecido a lo que hacía Indurain en Banesto con los premios de carrera). Al llegar a McLaren pretendía hacer lo mismo pero Ron se lo prohibió porque podría parecer que perjudicaba a Ham y bla, y bla, y bla…
    -Queda claro que la aparición de esta información en los medios no es más que una filtración interesada y tergiversada por parte del equipo a la prensa para “echar más mierda” sobre Alonso.
    -Por supuesto la prensa británica y alemana (también la italiana pero en menor medida) se han tirado a la yugular directamente y la española…bueno, la española como siempre: quijotesca. Hoy mismo deportes de la Cuatro afirmaba que Alonso paga a los mecánicos por quedar delante de Ham (y hacían la gracia de que, encima, era tacaño)
    -Todo esto que está sucediendo últimamente sólo tiene una explicación por mucho que lo desmientan representantes, escudería, piloto, etc.: todas las partes (Mc Laren-prensa inglesa, Mercedes-prensa alemana y Fernando) saben que Alonso no va a estar en Mc Laren la próxima temporada. Os juro que, hasta hoy mismo, yo creía que se quedaba; más que nada porque no veo muchas salidas “competitivas”
    -Estos últimos ataques desaforados por parte de Ron sólo se explican de dos formas: una por Alonso: “no te voy a facilitar la salida, si quieres te vas pero pagando” y otra por su propia defensa: a ver como explica que un equipo con el mejor coche, el mejor piloto del mundo y la mejor promesa del mundo acabe como está acabando. Un equipo que estaba llamado a ser el Ferrari de Schumacher.
    -Todos, parece, que nos morimos de ganas de ver a Fernando en Renault el año que viene. Bien, estaría fenomenal el equipo Fla-Alonso pero…¿Cuántas carreras tardaríamos en cansarnos de ver a Alonso 4º, 5º…7º?
    -Me huelo una rueda de prensa a final de temporada como para grabarla en video…
    -SHHHHHHHHHH….YAAAAA….DESPERTAD ;-D

  3. A mi personalmente me encantaría ver a Fernando vestido de rojo, pero a día de hoy no se que viabilidad tiene esto.

    En cualquier caso lo que queda claro es que nada es lo que parece, ni la Formula Uno es un deporte, ni la prensa informa.

    Muy bueno el adjetivo para la prensa española “quijotesca”… en fin.

  4. Soy de la opinión de boticas, veo de rojo a Fernando el año que viene, por indicios, guiños y por supuesto, por la forma de atacarle por todas partes.

    Sí Ron pensara que se quedaba en Mc no le atacaría de esta forma, a no ser que quiera meterle presión para que se despiste y Ham gane el campeonato, pero dudo mucho que Fernando le pueda perdonar y preparar el coche para el años que viene.

    Sí sabe Ron, que se vá, es una forma de desprestigiarle, de cara al futuro y de cara también, a que Ham gane este año.

    De cualquier manera, la única salida que tiene Ron es echar la culpa a otros y el más propicio para recibir la puntilla es Fernando, que nadie lo defiende, y tampoco puede decir nada en este momento. La prensa española, deja mucho que desear y desde luego se nota que no están a la altura de las circunstancias. Un saludo.

  5. Gracias por la aclaración boticas, un comentario enriquecedor.
    Lo del equipo español sería la crema. Ya va siendo hora de que nos pongamos a la altura de otros paises en este banco de pruebas que es la F1. Ingenieros cualificados hay de sobra y gente voluntariosa y con ganas de comerse el mundo también. Patrocinadores no faltan (Telefonica, Repsol y Santander tienen experiencia en la F1) y alguna empresa potente podría unirse a la fiesta si se monta un equipo.
    No somos peores que el resto.

  6. Superior boticas, superior. Muchas gracias!!!!!!!!!!

  7. Gracias jefe…el mérito no es la opinión….el mérito es tragarse el telediario de T5 :D

  8. boticas gracias por las aclaraciones del dinero :)

    “En la Fórmula 1 todos se conocen” (y saben dónde viven, así que cuidadito)

    Aún no me he terminado de decidir respecto a si el título de pilotos está manchado…

  9. La ración anti-Hamilton que todos queremos ver. Además en su propia casa…(Una de las webs que más se dedican a la caza de Fernando)

    http://www.planetf1.com/story/0,18954,3263_2737504,00.html

    …bueno, no se puede negar que hay gente que no lo traga (o no lo compra, como ellos dicen)

  10. Que nadie se olvide de que McLaren necesita (todavía) a Alonso… Si Hamilton hace un DNF, Kimi se lo pasa por la piedra con bastantes probabilidades.
    Esperemos que Kimi pueda aguantar hasta la última carrera, porque si no, mucho me temo que Alonso va a tener una avería misteriosa.
    Lo de Alonso y el 2008 … un misterio insondable, pero cuando hagan las primeras pruebas sin CT, vereis como McLaren empieza a querer a Alonso mucho más.

  11. Estoy contigo.

    pensad una cosa: si hamilton con control de tracción va bloqueando ruedas en cada curva, cómo lo hara sin ella?

    Lo veo contra los muros en cada gran premio… jejejej

  12. hola a todos, la verdad es que me apresurado a escribir porque acabo de leer sendos articulos de dos especimenes que se hacen llamar periodistas. Carlos Monasterio y Miguel Angel Arregui (el ojo dijital) calumnian e insultan a Alonso de la forma mas descarada e indignante. Me parece totalmente injusto ver como utilizan argumentos sin base alguna para descalificar a nuestro mejor deportista (o por lo menos uno de los mejores de los ultimos tiempos).
    Pase que la prensa inglesa o alemana se salgan de tono, pero que lo hagan estos personajes???? que indignación.

  13. FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DE L’ AUTOMOBILE
    World Motor Sport Council
    Decision
    Re: Article 151(c) International Sporting Code – Vodafone McLaren
    Mercedes
    13 September 2007
    The World Motor Sport Council (“WMSC”) met on 13th September 2007 to consider a
    charge that Vodafone McLaren Mercedes (“McLaren”) had breached Article 151(c) of
    the International Sporting Code.
    1 Background
    1.1 Scuderia Ferrari Marlboro (“Ferrari”) has submitted that it received information
    on 24 June 2007 suggesting that unauthorised use may have been made of certain
    of its confidential information. Ferrari has submitted that it subsequently learned
    that certain of its confidential information had come into possession of Mr.
    Michael Coughlan (“Coughlan”), the then Chief Designer of McLaren.
    1.2 On 3 July 2007, in the context of litigation in the High Court of England and
    Wales (“High Court Proceedings”) between Ferrari and Coughlan, a search was
    undertaken at the private residence of Coughlan under the authority of that Court.
    According to the evidence before the WMSC, during that search, a dossier of
    some 780 pages of confidential information belonging to Ferrari was recovered.
    1.3 In light of the results of the search, Ferrari wrote to the FIA late on 3 July 2007
    inviting it to consider whether the FIA should launch an investigation into the
    matter.
    1.4 After preliminary investigations, on 12 July 2007 the FIA wrote to McLaren
    requesting it to appear at an extraordinary meeting of the WMSC in Paris on 26
    July 2007 (“the 26 July WMSC meeting”). McLaren was informed that, at the 26
    July WMSC meeting, it would be asked to answer the charge that between March
    and July 2007, in breach of Article 151(c) of the International Sporting Code, it
    had unauthorised possession of documents and confidential information belonging
    to Ferrari. In particular, McLaren was charged with the unauthorised possession
    of one or more of the following technical documents that could be used for one or
    more of the following purposes: designing, engineering, building, checking,
    testing, developing and running a 2007 Ferrari Formula One car, including
    drawings, lay-out and digital mock-up schemes, technical documents and reports
    and procedures relating, amongst other things, to weight distribution,
    aerodynamics, component designs, suspension, gearbox, hydraulic, water, oil and
    fuel system designs, assembly and building technology designs.
    1.5 In response to the charge, McLaren made extensive written submissions in
    advance of the 26 July WMSC meeting and made detailed oral argument at the
    meeting itself. McLaren did not dispute that Coughlan had come into possession
    of Ferrari confidential information but argued, inter alia:
    (i) that the Ferrari confidential information in question had not been circulated
    within McLaren;
    (ii) that McLaren had neither used nor benefited from the receipt by Coughlan of
    the Ferrari confidential information; and
    (iii) that the actions of Coughlan in receiving and dealing with the Ferrari
    confidential information were those of a “rogue employee” for which McLaren
    should not be held responsible.
    1.6 The WMSC considered the arguments and evidence presented by McLaren at the
    26 July WMSC meeting and came to the conclusion that McLaren had been in
    possession of Ferrari confidential information and was therefore in breach of
    Article 151(c) of the International Sporting Code.
    1.7 Although a number of unsatisfactory elements were noted during the
    deliberations, in assessing the gravity of the breach, the WMSC concluded that
    there was insufficient evidence that the information was used in such a way as to
    interfere with the running of the FIA Formula One World Championship (“the
    Championship”).
    1.8 However, conscious of, inter alia, the fact that several related procedures were
    ongoing (including, notably, the High Court Proceedings, a criminal investigation
    in Italy and various internal forensic investigations at McLaren and Ferrari), the
    WMSC explicitly reserved the right to revisit its conclusions if further
    information came to light, in particular information showing that Ferrari
    confidential information had been used by McLaren to the detriment of the
    Championship.
    1.9 The following Decision was therefore reached:
    “The WMSC is satisfied that Vodafone McLaren Mercedes was in possession of
    confidential Ferrari information and is therefore in breach of article 151c of the
    International Sporting Code. However, there is insufficient evidence that this
    information was used in such a way as to interfere improperly with the FIA
    Formula One World Championship. We therefore impose no penalty.
    But if it is found in the future that the Ferrari information has been used to the
    detriment of the championship, we reserve the right to invite Vodafone McLaren
    Mercedes back in front of the WMSC where it will face the possibility of exclusion
    from not only the 2007 championship but also the 2008 championship.
    The WMSC will also invite Mr Stepney and Mr Coughlan to show reason why
    they should not be banned from international motor sport for a lengthy period
    and the WMSC has delegated authority to deal with this matter to the legal
    department of the FIA.”
    2 Re-convening of WMSC
    2.1 Subsequent to the WMSC Decision of 26 July 2007 (the “26 July Decision”), new
    evidence came to light which, in the FIA’s assessment merited consideration by
    the WMSC.
    2.2 A new meeting of the WMSC was therefore convened for 13 September 2007
    (“the 13 September WMSC meeting”).
    2.3 All relevant parties (including McLaren and Ferrari) were informed of the new
    meeting and were given copies of the new evidence put before the WMSC (in
    some limited cases, after redaction of confidential information). McLaren and
    Ferrari were invited to make written submissions which have been duly received
    by the WMSC.
    2.4 Oral submissions and explanations have also been made on behalf of McLaren
    and Ferrari and at the 13 September WMSC meeting, the WMSC has put
    questions to those concerned. Opportunities were also offered and taken up for
    McLaren and Ferrari to cross-examine each others’ witnesses.
    2.5 Some of the key elements that the WMSC has considered are set out below. In
    light of the strong imperative in the interests of the sport to issue a swift ruling,
    the following does not constitute an exhaustive list of the elements considered nor
    does it purport to be a summary of all of the evidence put before the WMSC.
    3 New Evidence – E-mails between McLaren Drivers
    3.1 In the period after the 26 July Decision, the FIA was made aware of a specific
    allegation that e-mails relevant to the FIA’s investigation had been exchanged
    between certain McLaren drivers.
    3.2 The FIA therefore wrote to three McLaren drivers (Mr. Alonso, Mr. Hamilton and
    Mr. de la Rosa) to establish whether or not this allegation had any basis in fact
    and requested that they produce copies of any relevant documents, including any
    electronic communications (howsoever conveyed or stored) which may be
    relevant to this case and which make reference to Ferrari, Ferrari’s employee
    Nigel Stepney (“Stepney”) or any technical or other information coming from or
    connected with either Ferrari or Stepney.
    3.3 The McLaren drivers were reminded of their duty as competitors and Super
    Licence holders to ensure the fairness and legitimacy of the Formula One World
    Championship. Given the importance of establishing the facts and that the
    information might not come out any other way, the FIA offered the assurance that
    any information made available in response to the letter would not result in any
    proceedings against the drivers personally under the International Sporting Code
    or the Formula One Regulations. However, the drivers were notified that if it
    later came to light that they had withheld any potentially relevant information,
    serious consequences could follow.
    3.4 All three drivers responded. Mr. Hamilton responded that he had no information
    responsive to the FIA’s request. Mr. Alonso and Mr. de la Rosa both submitted emails
    to the FIA which the WMSC finds highly relevant. Subsequently (at
    McLaren’s request) both Mr. Alonso and Mr. de la Rosa made written statements
    to the WMSC verifying that these e-mails were sent and received and offering
    context and explanations regarding the e-mails. The e-mails show unequivocally
    that both Mr. Alonso and Mr. de la Rosa received confidential Ferrari information
    via Coughlan; that both drivers knew that this information was confidential
    Ferrari information and that both knew that the information was being received by
    Coughlan from Stepney.
    weight distribution
    3.5 On 21 March 2007 at 09.57 Mr. de la Rosa wrote to Coughlan in the following
    terms:
    “Hi Mike, do you know the Red Car’s Weight Distribution? It would be
    important for us to know so that we could try it in the simulator. Thanks in
    advance, Pedro.
    p.s. I will be in the simulator tomorrow.”
    3.6 In his evidence given to the WMSC, Mr. de la Rosa confirmed that Coughlan
    replied by text message with precise details of Ferrari’s weight distribution.
    3.7 On 25 March 2007 at 01.43 Mr. de la Rosa sent an e-mail to Fernando Alonso
    which sets out Ferrari’s weight distribution to two decimal places on each of
    Ferrari’s two cars as set up for the Australian Grand Prix.
    3.8 Mr. Alonso replied to this e-mail on 25 March 2007 at 12.31 (they were in
    different time zones). His e-mail includes a section headed “Ferrari” in which he
    says “its weight distribution surprises me; I don’t know either if it’s 100%
    reliable, but at least it draws attention”. The e-mail continues with a discussion
    of how McLaren’s weight distribution compares with Ferrari’s.
    3.9 Mr. de la Rosa replied on 25 March 2007 13.02 stating the following:
    “All the information from Ferrari is very reliable. It comes from Nigel Stepney,
    their former chief mechanic – I don’t know what post he holds now. He’s the
    same person who told us in Australia that Kimi was stopping in lap 18. He’s very
    friendly with Mike Coughlan, our Chief Designer, and he told him that.”
    3.10 Mr. de la Rosa’s e-mail to Coughlan specifically stated that he wished to receive
    Ferrari’s weight distribution for the purposes of testing it in the simulator the
    following day (“It would be important for us to know so that we could try it in the
    simulator”). Mr. de la Rosa explained to the WMSC at the meeting of 13
    September 2007 that when Coughlan responded with the precise details in
    question, he (de la Rosa) decided that the weight distribution was so different to
    the McLaren car set up that it would not, in fact, be tested in the simulator. Mr de
    la Rosa says that thereafter he regarded the information as unimportant. It seems
    highly unlikely to the WMSC that a test driver would take a decision of this sort
    on his own. It also is not clear why, if Mr. de la Rosa regarded this information as
    unimportant, he would still convey and discuss it with Mr. Alonso some days later
    in his e-mail exchange of 25th March. Mr. de la Rosa’s evidence also makes clear
    that there was no reluctance or hesitation about testing the Ferrari information for
    potential benefit, but only that on this occasion he says that there was a technical
    reason not to do so.
    3.11 McLaren’s Chief Engineer Mr. Lowe gave clear evidence that decisions relating
    to simulator testing would normally involve a number of engineering and other
    staff (as would running the tests themselves). It seems highly unlikely that
    decisions about what would be run in the simulator would by taken by a test
    driver on his own.
    flexible wing and aero balance
    3.12 In the same e-mail exchange of 25 March 2007, Mr. de la Rosa states that tests
    had been carried out on a flexible rear wing which Mr. de la Rosa says is “a copy
    of the system we think Ferrari uses”. The Ferrari car’s precise aero balance at 250
    kph is also identified. While it is conceivable that the former item could have
    been copied from observation of the Ferrari car, it is clear from the context of the
    exchange (it being part of the information that Mr. de la Rosa describes as being
    “very reliable” because it comes from Stepney) that the latter item is confidential
    to Ferrari and that it was passed to Mr. de la Rosa by Coughlan, who got it from
    Stepney.
    tyre gas
    3.13 Mr de la Rosa’s e-mail to Mr. Alonso on 25 March 2007 at 01.43 identified a gas
    that Ferrari uses to inflate its tyres to reduce the internal temperature and
    blistering. The e-mail concludes with a statement (in relation to the gas) that
    “we’ll have to try it, it’s easy!”.
    3.14 Mr Alonso replied at 12.31 that it is “very important” that McLaren test the gas
    that Ferrari uses in its tyres as “they have something different from the rest”, and
    “not only this year. there is something else and this may be the key; let’s hope
    we can test it during this test, and that we can make it a priority!”.
    3.15 Mr. de la Rosa replied on 25 March 2007 13.02 stating the following: I agree
    100% that we must test the [tyre gas] thing very soon.
    3.16 Although the e-mail exchange between Mr. Alonso and Mr. de la Rosa makes
    clear that they both were enthusiastic about trying the gas apparently used by
    Ferrari in its tyres, Mr de la Rosa’s evidence to the WMSC was that he, on his
    own, decided to explore with a Bridgestone engineer whether the McLaren team
    should try this gas. He states that he had no other conversations with any other
    specialist staff within McLaren. His evidence is that the Bridgestone engineer in
    question doubted whether the gas would confer an advantage upon McLaren.
    According to Mr de la Rosa, without further consultation with anyone else at
    McLaren, and despite the fact that this had apparently been successfully used at
    Ferrari, the idea was dropped and no actual attempt was made to test the gas in the
    tyres used by McLaren.
    3.17 It seems unlikely to the WMSC that a test driver would engage in such
    consultations on his own without discussing it any further with anyone else at the
    team. It also seems unlikely that a decision on whether to pursue the matter
    further would be taken by a test driver on his own. Finally, Mr de la Rosa’s
    evidence makes clear that there was no reluctance or hesitation about using the
    Ferrari information, but only that on this occasion it was concluded that there
    would be no advantage in doing so.
    braking system
    3.18 On 12 April 2007 at 12.25 Mr. de la Rosa wrote to Mr. Coughlan and asked “ can
    you explain me as much as you can, Ferrari’s braking system with the [reference
    to detailed technical information]? Are they adjusting from inside the cockpit…?”
    3.19 After a number of exchanges about whether a description would be too
    complicated to articulate by e-mail, Mr. Coughlan replies on 14 April 2007 at
    14.40 with a technical description which purports to be a description of the
    principles underpinning the Ferrari braking system. Ferrari have confirmed that
    the description given is an accurate (though incomplete) description of the
    principles of its braking system. Coughlan concludes with a statement that “we
    are looking at something similar”. This latter statement strongly suggests that the
    McLaren system was being worked on from a position of knowledge of the details
    of the Ferrari system, which, even if the Ferrari system not being directly copied,
    must be more advantageous to McLaren than designing a system without such
    knowledge.
    3.20 The e-mail exchange between Mr. de la Rosa and Mr. Alonso dated 25 March
    2007 at 01.43 also describes some aspects of the McLaren braking system and
    states that “with the information that we have, we believe Ferrari has a similar
    system” and goes on to describe highly specific elements of the Ferrari system
    (which cannot be set out here for confidentiality reasons but which clearly
    demonstrate knowledge of Ferrari’s confidential information).
    stopping strategy
    3.21 As mentioned above, Mr. de la Rosa’s e-mail on 25 March 2007 13.02 stated “all
    the information from Ferrari is very reliable. It comes from Nigel Stepney, their
    former chief mechanic – I don’t know what post he holds now. He’s the same
    person who told us in Australia that Kimi was stopping in lap 18. He’s very
    friendly with Mike Coughlan, our Chief Designer, and he told him that.
    3.22 The evidence before the WMSC is that Mr. Räikkönen (Kimi) actually stopped at
    lap 19 at the Australian GP. However, the fact remains that Mr de la Rosa cited
    this information as a reason to believe that Stepney was a reliable source of
    information. This strongly suggests that McLaren had at least taken account of
    this information in determining its own strategy.
    3.23 The evidence before the WMSC also demonstrates that Stepney had fed
    information through Coughlan regarding which lap one or more of the Ferrari
    drivers would stop at during the Bahrain Grand Prix. McLaren has sought to
    discredit the significance of this information as it proved in the end to be
    inaccurate. However, the evidence before the WMSC was that the safety car had
    been deployed early in the race making it likely that stopping strategies would be
    adjusted. This deployment of the safety car could not have been known in
    advance of the race and the fact that the stoppage predictions proved inaccurate
    does not mean that McLaren had not considered and taken account of the
    information that had been received in determining its own strategy before the
    race.
    3.24 In any case, as there is no legitimate context in which another teams’ stopping
    strategy would be revealed to McLaren in advance, there is very clear evidence
    that both drivers knew that they were receiving unauthorised and confidential
    Ferrari information. To the WMSC’s knowledge, no effort was taken to report or
    stem this flow.
    4 New Evidence – Communications between Coughlan and Stepney
    4.1 The evidence put before the 26 July WMSC meeting indicated that a limited
    number of contacts had occurred between Coughlan and Stepney. Coughlan’s
    affidavit (submitted in the context of the High Court Proceedings) identified a
    number of such contacts and described incidents where specific Ferrari
    confidential information was transferred to him. The WMSC considered these
    contacts but had no specific evidence of further or other contacts. The focus at
    the 26 July WMSC meeting was on the circumstances surrounding the
    transmission of the 780 page Ferrari dossier discovered at Coughlan’s home.
    4.2 New evidence has come to light which strongly indicates that the transmission of
    confidential Ferrari information from Stepney to Coughlan was not limited to the
    780 page dossier. This evidence demonstrates that a far greater level of
    communication existed between Coughlan and Stepney than was appreciated at
    the 26 July WMSC meeting. This evidence was submitted by Ferrari and is
    deemed credible as it originates from the Italian police and is the result of an
    official analysis of records of telephone, SMS and e-mail contacts between
    Coughlan and Stepney. The evidence included the following.
    4.3 In its report “Allegato 18”, the Italian Police demonstrated that in the period 21
    March to 3 July 2007, Coughlan received 23 calls from Stepney’s personal mobile
    phone and made four calls to that phone. In the same period, Coughlan received
    124 SMS messages from Stepney and sent 66 SMS messages to Stepney.
    4.4 In its report “Allegato 9” the Italian Police have identified logs which show 23 emails
    passed between Coughlan and Stepney between 1 March and 14 April
    2007.
    4.5 In its report “Allegato 10” the Italian police have identified a further 98 SMS
    messages and a further eight telephone calls (on different phones) between
    Coughlan and Stepney between 11 March and 14 April 2007.
    4.6 In total, at least 288 SMS messages and 35 telephone calls appear to have passed
    between Coughlan and Stepney between 11 March 2007 and 3 July 2007.
    4.7 The number of contacts increased considerably during private tests carried out by
    Ferrari in Malaysia at the end of March 2007 and in the run up to and during the
    days of the Grands Prix in Australia on 18 March 2007, Malaysia on 8 April
    2007, Bahrain on 15 April 2007 and Spain on 13 May 2007.
    4.8 The evidence of the Italian police that has been produced also states that Stepney
    sought technical details from Ferrari’s chief mechanic, Mr Uguzzoni, about tests
    carried out by Ferrari in Malaysia in a way that drew attention within Ferrari at
    the time.
    4.9 In addition, e-mails between McLaren drivers were produced to the 13 September
    WMSC meeting (see above) stating clearly that Coughlan had received
    information from Stepney regarding the Ferrari car and had passed this
    information to others within the McLaren team.
    4.10 Neither Ferrari nor McLaren have ever disputed (whether at the 26 July WMSC
    meeting or since) that confidential Ferrari information was passed from Stepney
    to Coughlan during the period in question. However, the new evidence regarding
    the number and timing of the contacts makes it far more likely that there was a
    systematic flow of Ferrari confidential information to Coughlan leading to the
    conclusion that the illicit communication of information was very likely not
    limited to the transmission of the Ferrari dossier discovered at Coughlan’s home
    on 3 July 2007. This conclusion is corroborated in the e-mails exchanged
    between McLaren’s drivers (see above).
    4.11 McLaren stated in its submissions for the 13 September WMSC meeting that this
    new evidence on the number and timing of the communications merely confirmed
    what was already known: that Coughlan and Stepney were illicitly sharing Ferrari
    confidential information. It has also been suggested by McLaren that Coughlan
    and Stepney were acting on their own account and that possibly they were
    planning to seek new employment together elsewhere.
    4.12 Without drawing a definitive conclusion on this point, the WMSC considered that
    it was difficult to reconcile this version of events with the number and timing of
    the contacts described above as if Coughlan and Stepney had simply been sharing
    information to facilitate a plan to search for new employment there would appear
    to be no particular reason for the contacts to have intensified around the tests and
    the Grands Prix and no reason for Coughlan to share information with McLaren’s
    drivers. Rather, it appeared more likely that the information being exchanged
    related to those tests and the Grands Prix.
    4.13 Further, in light of Coughlan’s role within the McLaren team, it had seemed
    unlikely to the WMSC at the meeting on 26 July 2007 that Coughlan himself
    would have been able to make any direct or immediate use (whether personal or
    within his role at McLaren) of up to date information relating to the Ferrari car at
    the site of different Grands Prix. However, as detailed above, at the 13 September
    WMSC meeting, the WMSC heard new evidence to suggest that this was not the
    case and that Coughlan had, in fact, communicated to at least one McLaren driver
    statements from Stepney of which lap the Ferrari drivers would stop at during
    both the Australian Grand Prix and the Bahrain Grand Prix. These
    communications between Coughlan and at least one of the McLaren drivers
    coincided exactly in time with some of the most intense period of contact between
    Coughlan and Stepney described above.
    4.14 In the absence of another explanation, in light of the number and timing of the
    communications between Coughlan and Stepney and the e-mail exchanges
    between the McLaren drivers (see above), the WMSC regards it as reasonable to
    infer that Coughlan was in receipt of a flow of confidential Ferrari information
    from Stepney and that at least some of that information was communicated to
    others within McLaren (e.g. Mr. de la Rosa and Mr. Alonso).
    4.15 In sum, the new information on the number and timing of the contacts between
    Coughlan and Stepney inevitably had an impact on the WMSC’s appreciation of
    the nature of the contacts between Coughlan and Stepney, on its appreciation of
    the emails between the drivers and on the likelihood of Ferrari confidential
    information received by Coughlan having an influence on his work with
    McLaren.
    5 Coughlan’s Role at McLaren
    5.1 McLaren’s submission made for and at the 26 July WMSC meeting indicated that
    Coughlan had a relatively limited managerial role and that it would not be
    possible for him to propose ideas without having to explain their provenance. In
    McLaren’s submission, this demonstrated that, despite having detailed Ferrari
    technical information, Coughlan could not have used any of this information to
    benefit McLaren without a significant number of people at McLaren knowing.
    McLaren submitted statements from a number of its engineers that those
    engineers were not aware of changes made to the McLaren car using confidential
    Ferrari information.
    5.2 The submissions made for the 13 September WMSC meeting show that that
    Coughlan may have had a more active role in the design of the McLaren car than
    previously appreciated by the WMSC.
    5.3 The WMSC does not have evidence that any complete Ferrari design was copied
    and subsequently wholly incorporated into the McLaren car as a result of
    Coughlan passing confidential from Stepney to McLaren. However, it is difficult
    to accept that the secret Ferrari information that was within Coughlan’s
    knowledge never influenced his judgement in the performance of his duties. It is
    not necessary for McLaren to have copied a complete Ferrari design for it to have
    benefited from Coughlan’s knowledge. For example, the secret Ferrari
    information cannot but have informed the views Coughlan expressed to others in
    the McLaren design department, for example regarding which design projects to
    prioritise or which research to pursue. The advantage gained may have been as
    subtle as Coughlan being in a position to suggest alternative ways of approaching
    different design challenges.
    6 Evidence of Mr. Neale
    6.1 At the 26 July WMSC meeting (and the evidence was repeated at the hearing of
    13 September) it was noted that Coughlan had revealed to his superior at
    McLaren, Mr. Neale, that Stepney had attempted to pass secret Ferrari
    information to Coughlan. A firewall was set up at the instigation of Mr. Neale to
    prevent further contacts from Stepney and Coughlan was directed to cease contact
    with Stepney. Within a matter of weeks thereafter, Coughlan attempted to show
    some photographs to Mr. Neale which, according to Mr. Neale himself, because
    of the manner in which they were produced, suggested to Mr. Neale that they
    should not have been in Coughlan’s possession. Rather than establish the facts
    and take appropriate action as his superior at McLaren, Mr. Neale advised
    Coughlan to destroy the photographs. Coming as soon as it did after McLaren
    had been required to install a firewall and had directed this same employee to
    cease contact with a known source of Ferrari confidential information, the WMSC
    notes that it is very unsatisfactory that no further action was taken to investigate
    this matter further and make appropriate disclosures to the FIA as regulator.
    7 Nature of the information held by McLaren
    7.1 The WMSC believes that the nature of the information illicitly held by McLaren
    was information of a nature which, if used or in any way taken into account, could
    confer a significant sporting advantage upon McLaren.
    7.2 Evidence was submitted at the 13 September WMSC meeting by McLaren’s
    Engineering Director, Mr. Lowe, that the dossier of Ferrari information found in
    Coughlan’s possession did not contain information of particular use or interest to
    McLaren on the basis that the McLaren car was significantly different to the
    Ferrari car. This submission was apparently made on the basis of the review of
    the index to the dossier of Ferrari documents (Mr. Lowe having stated that he had
    not seen the dossier itself).
    7.3 The WMSC does not accept this account. In both WMSC hearings and in written
    submissions, and from the direct knowledge of the WMSC Members, Formula
    One teams have great interest in each others’ technology and go to considerable
    lengths (within the rules) to study each other’s designs and innovations through
    direct observation, photographic evidence and other means. In addition the
    technical information in Coughlan’s possession was, in the WMSC’s
    appreciation, highly significant and could certainly confer a sporting advantage, if
    used or taken into account.
    8 WMSC’s Assessment
    8.1 The WMSC has carefully considered the evidence and submissions of all parties.
    8.2 It has concluded (and intends to re-affirm) that a breach of Article 151(c) has
    occurred.
    8.3 In the 26 July Decision, the WMSC found a breach of Article 151(c). In
    assessing the gravity of that breach, it took account of a number of factors
    including any evidence (or, at the time, lack of it) to suggest that the Ferrari
    information improperly held had actually been used and actually conferred a
    sporting advantage. Other factors that it took into account included the argument
    that there was little evidence of the information in question being disseminated to
    others at McLaren, what the WMSC then understood to be Coughlan’s more
    limited role and the argument that Coughlan was a single rogue employee.
    8.4 McLaren has made detailed submissions indicating that none of the information
    received enhanced the McLaren car. McLaren has suggested to the WMSC that
    unless “actual use” and a demonstrated and itemised performance advantage can
    be proven beyond a reasonable doubt (i.e. to a criminal law standard of proof), the
    WMSC is not permitted at law to impose a penalty.
    8.5 The WMSC rejects this suggestion. The WMSC has full jurisdiction to apply
    Article 151(c) and stresses that it is not necessary for it to demonstrate that any
    confidential Ferrari information was directly copied by McLaren or put to direct
    use in the McLaren car to justify a finding that Article 151(c) was breached and/or
    that a penalty is merited. Nor does the WMSC need to show that any information
    improperly held led to any specifically identified sporting advantage, or indeed
    any advantage at all. Rather, the WMSC is entitled to treat possession of another
    team’s information as an offence meriting a penalty on its own if it so chooses.
    8.6 The fact that in its 26 July Decision, based on more limited evidence, the Council
    had a different appreciation of the gravity of McLaren’s breach does not lead to
    the creation of a legal test regarding the WMSC’s burden of proof. The WMSC
    could have imposed a penalty with the 26 July Decision based on the evidence
    therein, but chose not to (based in part on McLaren’s submissions that there had
    been no dissemination of Ferrari information beyond Mr Coughlan).
    8.7 The WMSC has taken note of McLaren’s position that an injustice would occur if
    a penalty were imposed without the FIA having accepted McLaren’s offer to
    inspect the McLaren premises and designs for evidence of Ferrari technology
    having been copied. However, as noted above, neither the finding of a breach nor
    the imposition of a penalty require evidence of McLaren having directly
    incorporated Ferrari technology. Nonetheless, the WMSC have noted and taken
    account of the open and co-operative nature of this offer and taken this into
    account in reaching this Decision.
    8.8 In light of the evidence now before it, the WMSC does not accept that the only
    actions of McLaren deserving censure were those of Coughlan. While this
    situation might have originated with the actions of a single rogue McLaren
    employee acting on his own and without McLaren’s knowledge or consent,
    evidence is now available which, when taken in its full context, makes clear that:
    – Coughlan had more information than previously appreciated and was
    receiving information in a systematic manner over a period of months;
    – the information has been disseminated, at least to some degree (e.g. to Mr. de
    la Rosa and Mr. Alonso), within the McLaren team;
    – the information being disseminated within the McLaren team included not
    only highly sensitive technical information but also secret information
    regarding Ferrari’s sporting strategy;
    – Mr de la Rosa, in the performance of his functions at McLaren, requested and
    received secret Ferrari information from a source which he knew to be
    illegitimate and expressly stated that the purpose of his request was to run
    tests in the simulator;
    – the secret information in question was shared with Mr. Alonso;
    – there was a clear intention on the part of a number of McLaren personnel to
    use some of the Ferrari confidential information in its own testing. If this was
    not in fact carried into effect it was only because there were technical reasons
    not to do so;
    – Coughlan’s role within McLaren (as now understood by the WMSC) put him
    in a position in which his knowledge of the secret Ferrari information would
    have influenced him in the performance of his duties.
    8.9 It seems to the WMSC clear that Coughlan’s actions were intended by him to give
    McLaren a sporting advantage. He fed information about Ferrari’s stopping
    strategy, braking system, weight distribution and other matters to McLaren’s test
    driver. Furthermore, in light of Coughlan’s undoubted experience, he is likely to
    have known a great deal about how to confer an advantage and the roles of
    different personnel within the team. It seems most unlikely that he confined his
    activities to sharing Ferrari’s information with Mr. de la Rosa. It also seems most
    unlikely that his own work was not influenced in some way by the knowledge
    regarding the Ferrari car that he is known to have possessed.
    8.10 Furthermore, it seems entirely unlikely to the WMSC that any Formula One
    driver would bear the sole responsibility for handling or processing sensitive
    Ferrari information (e.g. on substances used to inflate tyres or weight distribution)
    or deciding how or whether such information would be used or tested. In light of
    his experience, Coughlan would have known this and if he intended to reveal this
    information to McLaren, he is unlikely to have done so only to Mr. de la Rosa .
    8.11 The WMSC therefore finds that a number of McLaren employees or agents were
    in unauthorised possession of, or knew or should have known that other McLaren
    employees or agents were in unauthorised possession of, highly confidential
    Ferrari technical information. In addition, the WMSC finds that there was an
    intention on the part of a number of McLaren personnel to use some of the Ferrari
    confidential information in its own testing.
    8.12 The evidence leads the WMSC to conclude that some degree of sporting
    advantage was obtained, though it may forever be impossible to quantify that
    advantage in concrete terms.
    8.13 These factors lead the WMSC to an appreciation of the gravity of McLaren’s
    breach which is materially different to the appreciation in the 26 July Decision.
    On this occasion the WMSC believes that a penalty is merited.
    8.14 Having indicated to McLaren that a penalty was likely to be imposed, the WMSC
    heard submissions regarding the appropriateness of penalties from McLaren and
    from counsel for Mr. Hamilton. The WMSC has reached its decision having
    taken due account of those submissions.
    9 Decision
    9.1 For the foregoing reasons, the WMSC finds McLaren in breach of Article 151(c)
    of the International Sporting Code.
    9.2 The WMSC therefore, in accordance with the provisions of the International
    Sporting Code, imposes the following sanctions relation to the 2007 FIA Formula
    One World Championship:
    – a penalty consisting of exclusion from and withdrawal of all points awarded to
    McLaren in all rounds of the 2007 Constructors’ Championship. For the
    avoidance of doubt, McLaren will be permitted to race in the remaining rounds of
    the 2007 Championship but will not be permitted to score points in the
    Constructors Championship or attend the podium in the event of a top three finish
    in any of the remaining races in the 2007 season. Points scored by other
    competitors in the Championship to date will not be affected further to the
    withdrawal of McLaren’s points;
    – a fine of USD100 million (less any sum that would have been payable by
    Formula One Management Limited on account of McLaren’s results in the 2007
    Constructors Championship had it not been excluded). This fine shall be payable
    within three months from the date of this Decision.
    9.3 Exceptionally, because primary responsibility must rest with McLaren, in the
    interests of the sport and also because McLaren’s drivers were offered immunity
    from individual sanction by the President of the FIA in his letter dated 30 August
    2007, the WMSC does not consider that it is appropriate to impose any sanction
    on them individually or impose sanctions on McLaren which would affect these
    drivers’ individual Championship standings. As such, both McLaren drivers will
    retain all the drivers’ Championship points they have won so far in the 2007
    season and will be permitted to win drivers’ Championship points and attend the
    podium in the remaining races of the 2007 season.
    9.4 In addition, in the interest of ensuring that McLaren is not unfairly advantaged as
    against any of its competitors in the 2008 Championship, the WMSC instructs the
    FIA technical department to conduct an investigation of McLaren’s preparatory
    work on its 2008 car with a view to determining whether that car incorporates any
    Ferrari confidential information and report back before the WMSC meeting of
    December 2007. Once the WMSC has considered this report, a separate Decision
    will be taken regarding McLaren’s participation in the 2008 Championship,
    including whether any penalty should be imposed. This present Decision does not
    in any way affect McLaren’s entitlement to participate in the 2008 Championship
    if the entry conditions are fulfilled.
    9.5 McLaren is reminded of its right of appeal. In the event that an appeal is lodged
    with the FIA International Court of Appeal, the effect of this Decision will not be
    suspended pending the outcome of that appeal.
    Signed:
    __________________________________________
    Max Mosley
    FIA President
    Paris, 13 September 2007

    Fla: Querido mario1961 con un poner un enlace (cosa que ya hacía yo) es suficiente, no hace falta copiar y pegar las toda la sentencia. Gracias, en cualquier caso, por participar :)

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